










SABOTAGING POTENTIAL RIVALS 
 
 




CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1500 
CATEGORY 2: PUBLIC CHOICE 
JULY 2005 
 
PRESENTED AT CESIFO AREA CONFERENCE ON 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com









This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, 
we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential 
or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy 
equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able 
contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage 
is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a 
unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage. 
JEL Code: D72, D74. 






J. Atsu Amegashie 
Department of Economics 
University of Guelph 
Guelph, Ontario 
Canada N1G 2W1 
jamegash@uoguelph.ca 
Marco Runkel 
Department of Economics 
University of Munich 








We thank participants of the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society in New 
Orleans and participants of seminars at the Universities of Munich and Waterloo for helpful 
comments, especially John Burbidge, Lutz-Alexander Busch, and Frank Westermann.   1
                                                
1. Introduction 
 
In contests like political competitions, rent-seeking or R&D races, a contestant basically 
has two options to increase her probability of success. She can spend effort to improve 
her own performance and/or effort that reduces a particular rival’s performance. The 
latter effort is usually understood as sabotage. There is a growing and interesting 
literature on sabotage or negative activities in contests and organizations, for example 
Auriol et al. (2003), Chen (2003), Konrad (2000), Kräkel (2004), Lazear (1989), and 
Skarpedas and Grofman (1995). The authors characterize equilibria in contests with 
sabotage and compare them with the equilibria when sabotage is not possible. 
  All these articles investigate single-stage contests
1 and, thus, necessarily focus on 
sabotage of current opponents. But contestants sometimes have incentives to sabotage 
potential or future rivals. Chen (2003, footnote 1) observes that “[o]ne example in U.S. 
politics is Mario Cuomo, ex governor of New York. For many years, he had been 
considered a top contender for the U.S. presidency, but he eventually faded from the 
scene. Simply, too many people had seen him as a potential rival.” (italics ours). A 
similar example is Howard Dean. For a long time, he was seen a top candidate of the 
Democrats in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. One may even argue that he would 
have been the stronger rival for the Republican candidate George Bush, since he was a 
strong opponent of the Iraq war, while the actual candidate of the Democrats, John Kerry, 
was titled a “Flip-Flopper” with respect to the Iraq war. But during the primaries of the 
Democrats in autumn 2003, several negative reports of Bush-friendly media appeared and 
 
1 Kräkel (2004) examines a two-stage game but not a two-stage contest. In his model, the contest for the 
prize only takes place in stage 2. In our model, the contest for the prize takes place in two stages. 
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reduced the chance of Dean to become the candidate of the Democrats.
2 Further examples 
for sabotage of potential rivals can be found in TV game shows like “The weakest Link”, 
“Survivor” and “Big Brother”. 
Motivated by these examples, this paper investigates sabotage of potential rivals. 
We develop a two-stage elimination contest model with four players who differ in the 
valuation of winning the contest. In the first stage, the players are grouped in two semi-
finals. The winners of the semi-finals advance to the second stage, the final. Both stages 
are modeled as all-pay auctions. Sabotage is incorporated in the model by assuming that 
before the elimination contest each contestant can decide whether she will help the 
weaker player in the other semi-final. One may argue that this support should be called a 
“subsidy” instead of “sabotage”. We prefer to use the term (indirect) sabotage because 
although a player indeed subsidizes a weaker player in another group, the main goal of 
the subsidy is to weaken the stronger player’s chances of advancing to the next stage.
 3
In this setting, we find that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-
strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while 
less able contestants do not. We also find that the most able contestant may prefer a 
situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another 
 
2 Of Course, it is difficult to say whether Dean did not succeed because he was “sabotaged” by supporters 
of Bush or because he did not find enough supporters among the Democrats. Dean himself states that he 
was sabotaged. See his interview regarding the “The Scream” at the webpage http://www.crocuta.net/Dean/ 
Dean_Interview_NHPR_June29_2004.htm. Moreover, it is interesting to note that there were discussions 
among Bush supporters whether it is a suitable option “...to sabotage the opposing party's primary to ensure 
the nomination of the worst candidate possible” (http://www.pejmanesque.com/archives/003745.html). 
3 In our model, this indirect sabotage is indeed equivalent to directly sabotaging the future rival. We use the 
indirect modeling since it is often observed in reality. For example, in the 2004 U.S. election campaign 
traditional Republican campaign contributors simultaneously contributed to Ralph Nader (an independent 
candidate) and George Bush. The contribution to Ralph Nader is to ensure that he draws away some votes 
from the Democratic candidate, John Kerry. Hence the Republicans indirectly sabotaged John Kerry 
through a third party, Ralph Nader. We wish to emphasize that this is an example of indirect sabotage. It is 
not an example of sabotaging a potential rival.   3
                                                
partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players engages in 
sabotage.  
Note that our model is based on the elimination contest in Groh et al. (2003). We 
introduce the sabotage of potential rivals in their model. However, our main focus is 
different. In an elimination contest without sabotage and four contestants, Groh et al. 
(2003) compare different partitions of contestants based on the following three criteria: 
(i) maximization of total productive effort in the contest, (ii) maximization of the 
probability of a final among the two top players, and (iii) maximization of the win 
probability for the top player. They also compare the partitions with respect to the 
property that a higher ranked player has a higher win probability. In contrast, we focus 
mainly on the sabotage incentives of the contestants under different partitions. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section sets up the general model. In 
Section 3, we derive equilibria for specific partitions of players. Section 4 discusses our 
results and explains in more detail the relation to results obtained in previous sabotage 
models. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Indirect Sabotage in an Elimination Contest 
We consider a two-stage elimination contest as in Groh et al. (2003).
4 However, unlike 
Groh et al. (2003), we introduce a pre-contest stage where players can decide to indirectly 
sabotage potential rivals. The contest is among four players labeled by 1, 2, 3, and 4. The 
timing of actions is as follows: In stage 0, players decide how much sabotage effort to 
expend. In stage 1 (the semi-finals), two players are put in a group in an all-pay auction 
 
4 For other papers on elimination contests, see Amegashie (1999, 2004), Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and 
Rosen (1986). where their valuations are their post-sabotage valuations. The winner in each group 
advances to stage 2 (the final), where the overall winner of the contest is determined 
again by an all-pay auction. 
  We call the efforts in the all-pay auctions on stage 1 and 2 “productive effort”. 
They are directly productive in the sense that a possible contest-designer puts a positive 
value on them. For example, in a sales contest, these efforts will be sales per contestant. 
But the sabotage effort in stage 0 is directly "unproductive" because the contest designer 
does not value this effort. Note, however, that we only focus on the positive implications 
of sabotage and do not discuss the optimal design of our contest. 
  4
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Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. We look for a subgame perfect 
equilibrium of our game by backward induction. We begin with stage 2: Denote the two 
finalists by   with  { 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 j , i ∈ j i ≠ . The finalists expend productive effort   and 
 in hope of winning the prize. Players i and j valuations of the prize are   and 
, respectively. Unless otherwise indicated, we assume that V
0 eif ≥
0 e jf ≥ i V
j V 1 > V2 > V3 > V4 > 0 and 
these valuations are commonly known by all contestants. The prize is awarded to the 
player with the higher effort. In case both efforts are the same, each finalist receives the 
prize with probability  2 1 . As in Groh et al. (2003), the finalists in stage 2 additionally 
receive a payment of k > 0, regardless of their effort in this stage.
5 Hence, for  , 
player i’s payoff in the final is 
jf if e e >
if i e k V − + . If  jf if e e < , then she receives   and in  if e k −
                                                 
5 As pointed out in Groh et al. (2003), “... this is a necessary condition for the existence of equilibria in the 
semi-finals”. Otherwise, there are, at least, two players whose valuations in the semi-finals are zero. These 
players will exert no effort in the semi-finals. But then a pure-strategy effort of zero is not an equilibrium 
strategy. 
 case of  , her payoff is  jf if e e = if i e k 2 V − + . The payoff of player j is computed in the 
same way. 
  It is well known that the equilibrium effort levels in such an all-pay auction are in 
mixed strategies. Based on results in Baye et al. (1996) and Hillman and Riley (1989), we 
can write the expected payoffs of player i and j in this equilibrium respectively as 
  () { } k 0 , V V max j , i j i 2 + − = Π ,  ( ) { } k 0 , V V max i , j i j 2 + − = Π .  (1) 
If  , the equilibrium winning probabilities of player i and j are  j i V V ≥ i j 2 i V 2 V 1 p − =  
and  , and equilibrium total expected effort amounts to  2 i 2 j p 1 p − = ( ) jj i V1VV 2 + . In 
case of  , we simply have to exchange the indices i and j in order to obtain the 
equilibrium winning probabilities and equilibrium total effort. For a given partition of 
players, the equilibrium in stage 2 is unique (see, Baye et al., 1996). 
j i V V ≤
  Let us now formalize stage 1. We denote the players in one semi-final by 
 and in the other semi-final by  { 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , h ∈ A } { } 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 n , m ∈  where  n m h ≠ ≠ ≠ A . Both 
semi-finals are all-pay auctions. To account for indirect sabotage, we assume that the 
valuation of a player in stage 1 is increased by the effort which other players expend in 
stage 0 in order to help this player and to indirectly sabotage potential rivals. This support 
can be interpreted as, e.g., an extra payment which the supported player receives or as a 
cost subsidy which improves the ability of the supported player in the semi-final. For the 
latter interpretation, note that the valuations in all-pay-auctions can be interpreted as the  
 
 
  5abilities of the contestants (Baye et al., 1996).
 6 
The support of m given to h is denoted by , the support of n to h by 
 and so on. Thus, player h’s and player  ’s valuation of winning the semi-final 
can be written as 
0 emh ≥
0 enh ≥ A
  () ( ) ( ) nh mh 2 1 n 2 1 n 1 h e e m , h p 1 n , h p + + Π − + Π = Π ,     (2) 
  () ( )( ) A A A A A n m 2 1 n 2 1 n 1 e e m , p 1 n , p + + Π − + Π = Π ,    (3) 
where   is the probability that n wins her semi-final against m. 1 n p
7  The first two terms in 
(2) represent player h’s expected payoff if she advances to the final and meets either m or 
n. The last two terms in (2) equal the support player h receives from m and n. If there 
were no help, a player’s valuation will be equal to the first two terms in the above 
expressions. A similar interpretation holds for (3). The valuations of m and n in the other 
semi-final are 
  () ( ) ( ) m hm 2 1 2 1 1 m e e h , m p 1 , m p A A A A + + Π − + Π = Π ,     (4) 
  () ( )( ) n hn 2 1 2 1 1 n e e h , n p 1 , n p A A A A + + Π − + Π = Π ,       ( 5 )  
where   is the probability that   wins her semi-final against h. The equilibria in the 
semi-finals are again in mixed-strategies. The equilibrium in each group is unique and 
can be characterized in the same way as the equilibrium in stage 2: The expected payoffs 
1 pA A
                                                 
6For the sake of analysis and to help focus on the role of sabotaging potential rivals, we do not consider 
sabotage of current rivals as in the single-state contests of Konrad (1999), Chen (2003), and Kräkel (2004). 
Moreover, note that in stage 2, the players' valuations revert to Vi and Vj. That is, the effect of sabotage is 
not permanent. 
7 To give the reader an idea of how the help given to a player in a contest might increase her valuation, 
consider a contest where a player has a cost of effort e and valuation, V. If the success probability is P, we 
can write her payoff as PV – e. Suppose someone subsidies her cost of effort such that (1-α) of her cost is 
reimbursed, where 0 < α < 1. Then her payoff is now PV – αe. But this can re-written as α[PV/α – e]. Given 
that α is constant, this is equivalent to the original contest with no subsidy but with a player whose 
valuation has increased from V to V/α. Hence, we capture the help given to a player as an increase in her 
valuation.
  6are analogous to (1) except for replacing the V’s by the Π’s defined in (2) – (5). And 
also the equilibrium total effort and the equilibrium winning probabilities,   and  , 
can be computed with the help of (2) – (5). In doing so, it is important to note that the 
valuations (2) – (5) themselves depend on   and  . Hence, when we solve the model 
in the next section, we have to compute   and   by determining a fixed point (see 
also Groh et al., 2003). 
1 n p 1 pA
1 n p 1 pA
1 n p 1 pA
  Finally, we turn to stage 0 where the players determine their sabotage effort. The 
overall-payoffs of the players in stage 0 can be written as 
  {} hn hm 1 1 h 0 h e e 0 , max − − Π − Π = Π A ,        ( 6 )  
  {} n m 1 h 1 0 e e 0 , max A A A A − − Π − Π = Π ,        ( 7 )  
  {} A m mh 1 n 1 m 0 m e e 0 , max − − Π − Π = Π ,        ( 8 )  
  {} A n nh 1 m 1 n 0 n e e 0 , max − − Π − Π = Π .        ( 9 )  
The players’ payoff in (6) – (9) equals the expected payoff the players receive from the 
semi-final (the maximum terms) less the sabotage efforts. In stage 0, we look for a pure-
strategy equilibrium in the sabotage effort levels.  
  
3.  Equilibrium under Different Seedings of Players 
There are different partitions of players in the semi-finals. These partitions are called 
seedings. Obviously, the properties of the equilibrium in our three-stage contest game 
depend on the seeding in the semi-finals. In what follows, we will therefore characterize 
the equilibrium for different seedings. 
 
  7 
3.1  Seeding A: {1-3} and {2-4} 
Suppose first that, in stage 1, players 1 and 3 belong to one group and players 2 and 4 
belong to the other group (we call this grouping of players seeding A). In the notation of 
the previous section, we have  1 h = ,  3 = A ,  2 m =  and  4 n = . Obviously, player 4 will 
not engage in sabotage, i.e.  0 e e 43 41 = =  is her dominant strategy, because according to 
V1 > V2 > V3 > V4 > 0  and (1) her expected payoff from the contest in stage 2 is k 
regardless of who she meets in that stage. Moreover, players 1 and 3 will benefit, if at all, 
only from sabotaging player 2 and player 2 only from sabotaging player 1. This implies 
.  0 e e e 21 32 12 = = =
Given these insights and taking into account the equilibrium expected payoffs (1) 
in the final, we may specify the players’ semi-final valuations (2) – (5) as 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) k V V p V V k V V p 1 k V V p 4 2 41 2 1 2 1 41 4 1 41 11 + − + − = + − − + + − = Π , (10) 
  () ( ) ( ) 23 4 3 41 23 41 4 3 41 31 e k V V p e k p 1 k V V p + + − = + − + + − = Π ,   (11) 
  () ( ) ( ) k V V p k p 1 k V V p 3 2 31 31 3 2 31 21 + − = − + + − = Π ,     (12) 
  () 34 14 34 14 31 31 41 e e k e e k p k p 1 + + = + + + − = Π .    (13) 
In stage 2, player 2’s net payoff if she meets player 3 instead of player 1 is  . This 
is an upper bound for her support of player 3, i.e., 
3 2 V V −
3 2 23 V V e − ≤ . In the semi-final 
between players 1 and 3, we then obtain from (10) and (11) 
  () ( )( ) 3 2 41 2 1 23 3 2 41 2 1 31 11 V V 1 p V V e V V p V V − − + − ≥ − − + − = Π − Π , (14) 
given  . Thus, no matter the relative size of the valuations   and  , 
player 1 has a higher valuation than player 3 in stage 1 (i.e., 
3 2 23 V V e − ≤ 41 Π 21 Π
31 11 Π > Π ), if 
  83 2 2 1 V V V V − ≥ − . It follows that when they contest in an all-pay auction in stage 1, 
player 1 will get a positive expected payoff, but player 3 will get a zero expected payoff. 
Hence,   implies that in stage 0 player 3 will not invest in sabotage. 
Therefore, in a reduced-form game obtained via backward induction,   is a 
dominant strategy for player 3 in stage 0.  
3 2 2 1 V V V V − ≥ −
0 e34 =
  It remains to specify the sabotage effort levels of player 1 and 2,   and   
Since   implies 
14 e 23 e.
3 2 2 1 V V V V − ≥ − 31 11 Π > Π , only two cases have to be distinguished: In 
case 1, we have   and  31 11 Π > Π 41 21 Π ≤ Π . According to (6) – (9) and the dominant 
strategies derived so far, the players’ payoffs in stage 0 are 
  ( ) 14 3 2 41 2 1 14 31 11 10 e V V p V V e − − + − = − Π − Π = Π , 0 30 = Π ,   (15) 
  () 3 2 31 14 21 41 40 V   V p e − − = Π − Π = Π ,  23 20 e − = Π .     (16) 
In case 2, we have   and  31 11 Π > Π 41 21 Π ≥ Π , and the players’ payoffs in stage 0 become 
  ( ) 14 23 3 2 41 2 1 14 31 11 10 e e V V p V V e − − − + − = − Π − Π = Π , 0 30 = Π , (17) 
  () 23 14 3 2 31 23 41 21 20 e e V   V p e − − − = − Π − Π = Π , 0 40 = Π .   (18) 
Players 1 and 2 will set their sabotage effort levels such that their payoff in stage 0 is 
maximized. In doing so, each of them takes into account the effect of her sabotage effort 
on the winning probabilities in stage 1,   and  . We look for a pure-strategy 
equilibrium. For notational convenience, let 
41 p 31 p
2 1 V V : a − = ,  3 2 V V : b − =  and  . 
We then obtain 
4 3 V V : c − =
 
 
  9 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose the players’ valuations are such that V1 > V2 > V3 > V4 and  
V1 – V2 ≥ V2 – V3, players 1 and 3 belong to one group and players 2 and 4 belong to 
another group and  . Then there exists a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium 
in which only the most able player (i.e., player 1) engages in sabotage. Her equilibrium 




  () [] () ()
() ( ) [] ()
1
e c b a 64 bc e c b a 4 e c b 8














+ + + − − +
− − − − + + + − −
.   (19) 
The equilibrium is such that,  41 21 Π < Π ,  31 11 Π > Π ,  2 1 p41 > ,  2 1 p31 < ,  , 
 and  . 
0 10 > Π
0 40 > Π 0 30 20 = Π = Π
 
Proof: We first look for a possible equilibrium in case 1, i.e.  31 11 Π > Π  and  . 
The players’ stage 0 payoffs in this case are captured by (15) and (16).   
immediately implies that   is a dominant strategy for player 2 in this subgame. In 
order to obtain player 1’s optimal sabotage effort, we first have to determine the 
equilibrium winning probabilities in stage 1,   and  , as functions of the sabotage 
effort chosen in stage 0. These functions are determined by using a result of Baye et al. 
(1996). Given   and 
41 21 Π ≤ Π
23 20 e − = Π
0 e23 =
31 p 41 p
31 11 Π > Π 41 21 Π ≤ Π , we obtain 




























− = . 
  10The fixed point of these equations with respect to   and   yields the desired 
functions. It is obtained by simultaneously solving the two equations above. For our 
purposes, we only need the solution for  . Letting  gives 
31 p 41 p
41 p 0 k →






41 e c b 8
e c b a 64 bc e c b a 4 bc e a c b 4
p
+
+ + + − − + − − +
= .   (20) 
Player 1 sets   such that   from (15) is maximized. Taking into account the 
derivative of (20) with respect to   yields 
14 e 10 Π
14 e
  () [] () ()
() ( ) [] ()
. 1
e c b a 64 bc e c b a 4 e c b 8

















+ + + − − +




The lowest sabotage effort which player 1 can choose in case 1 is the one which equates 
 and   or, equivalently, which reduces the winning probability of player 4 to  21 Π 41 Π
2 1 p41 = . From (20) we obtain  2 1 p41 =  iff  ( )
min
14 14 e : c 2 b 2 a 4 bc e = + + = . If we 
evaluate player 1’s marginal payoff (21) at  , we obtain 
min




c b a 4 c













= .      (22) 
This implies that, in case 1, player 1 always chooses an interior solution  . 
This is the solution to   = 0 in (21) above or, equivalently, to (19). We assume 
that a feasible solution exists. Indeed, we present an example in corollary 1. We can 
therefore conjecture that a possible candidate for a pure-strategy equilibrium is one in 
which players 2, 3, and 4 do not invest in sabotage, but player 1 chooses   
where   is implicitly defined by (19). In this possible equilibrium, we have 
0 e e
min
14 14 > >







14 e 41 21 Π < Π , 
,  31 11 Π > Π 2 1 p41 >  and  2 1 p31 < . To ensure that the candidate equilibrium is indeed 
  11an equilibrium, we have to make sure that the players do not have an incentive to deviate 
from their choice when we turn to case 2. 
  In case 2, we have  31 11 Π > Π  and  41 21 Π ≥ Π . The stage 0 payoffs are captured by 
(17) and (18). The winning probabilities in stage 1,   and  , are now functions of the 
sabotage efforts   and  . Using results of Baye et al. (1996) yield 
31 p 41 p
14 e 23 e




























Solving these equations with respect to   and   and letting   gives  31 p 41 p 0 k →
  () () []
ab 4




14 23 14 23
31
+ + − + + −
= ,     (23) 
  () () []
bc 2




14 23 23 14
41
+ + − + − +
= .   (24) 
Consider first player 2. She chooses   s u c h  t h a t   23 e 20 Π  from (18) is maximized. Taking 
into account the derivative of (23) with respect to   yields   23 e
  () [] ()
() []
1
abce 4 e c b be


















Since we assume V1 – V2 ≥ V2 – V3 or  , it is straightforward to show that  b a ≥
0 de d 23 20 < Π  for all  . Hence, player 2 has the dominant strategy   in 
this subgame and has no incentive to deviate from the candidate equilibrium we 
determined in case 1.  
0 e , e 14 23 ≥ 0 e23 =
Next turn to player 1. She sets   such that  14 e 10 Π  from (17) is maximized. Taking 
into account the derivatives of (24) with respect to   yields   14 e
  12  () () ()
()
1
abce 4 e c b c 2
















+ + + + + +
=
Π




abce 4 e c b

















.       (26) 
If  , then the numerator in (25) tends to   while the denominator tends to 
0. Hence,   implies 
0 e14 → 0 abc 2 >
0 e14 → ∞ → Π 14 10 de d.  I f   ∞ → 14 e , then L’Hôpital’s rule yields 
0 c b de d 14 10 > → Π  Equation (26) then implies  0 de d 14 10 > Π  for all  . Hence, 
player 1 chooses   as large as possible. Since it is straightforward to show that an 
increase in   increases   and decreases 
0 e14 ≥
14 e
14 e 31 11 Π − Π 41 21 Π − Π , player 1 sets   such that 
 or, equivalently, 
14 e
41 21 Π = Π 2 1 p41 = . Using (24) and  0 e23 = , we again obtain  2 1 p41 =  
iff  . But we know from our analysis of case 1, that player 1 obtains a higher 
payoff if she chooses  . Hence, player 1 also has no incentive to deviate 
from the candidate equilibrium in case 1. Therefore, this candidate equilibrium is indeed 
a pure-strategy equilibrium. This completes the proof of proposition 1. QED. 
min




14 14 e e e > =
 
Proposition 1 states that under seeding A, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium 
in which the most able contestant invests in sabotage, but all other (less able) contestants 
do not. The intuition is straightforward: Player 1 prefers to play the final against the 
weakest player (i.e. player 4) instead of the second-best player (i.e. player 2). Hence, 
player 1 supports player 4 such that this player has a higher chance of winning her semi-
final than player 2, even though player 2 is more able in the sense that she has a larger 
valuation of winning the final. This indirect sabotage of player 2 by player 1 implies that 
  13player 1’s and 4’s expected payoff in stage 0 is strictly positive, while players 2 and 3 
have zero expected payoff in stage 0. We will further discuss the rational of this result in 
section 4, when we compare our results with those of previous works. 
  Equation (19) can explicitly be solved for the equilibrium sabotage effort of 
player 1. This would yield some insights about the impact which the model parameters 
have on the magnitude of the sabotage effort. But in the general case, it does not provide 
useful analytical results. To highlight some properties of the sabotage equilibrium, we 
therefore focus on the special case where the differences between the valuations are 
equal, i.e. V1 – V2 = V2 – V3 = V3 – V4  : =  x > 0 or, equivalently, a = b = c   x > 0. 
Equation (19) then has three and only three solutions with respect to player 1’s sabotage 
effort: 
: =
4 x e14 =  and  ( ) 36 10 8 x e14 ± − = . But only the first solution is positive and 
only for this solution is the second-order condition for a local maximum satisfied. Using 
equations (15) and (20), player 1’s payoff at  4 x e14 = can be shown to equal 
( ) 0 x 4 8 3 x 10 > > + = Π . To show that this is a global maximum, we evaluate player 
1’s payoff at the extreme ends of the domain of e14 (i.e., at 0 and V2 – V4 = 2x). Using 
(15) and (20), player 1’s payoff at e14 = 0 is equal to x, since the limiting value of p41 = 0 
given e14 = 0. Using (15), player 1’s payoff is  ( ) 0 1 p x 41 < −  at e14 = 2x. Therefore, the 
payoffs at the extreme ends of the domain of e14 are less than  ( ) x 4 8 3 x 10 > + = Π , and 
the global maximum of player 1’s payoff is at  4 x e14 = . Since, players 2, 3, and 4 have 
strictly dominant strategies, we have a unique pure-strategy equilibrium with player 1’s 
sabotage effort  4 x e
*
14 = .
8 Using (10) – (13), (15), (16) and (20) it is straightforward to 
                                                 
8 Note that  4 x e
*
14 =  = c/4 < V2 – V4.  
  14compute the accompanying equilibrium winning probabilities, valuations in stage 1 and 
payoffs in stage 0. Overall, we obtain 
 
Corollary 1: Under the same conditions as in proposition 1 and additionally V1 – V2 = 
V2 – V3 = V3 – V4   x > 0, there exists a unique pure-strategy subgame perfect 





14 = . In this equilibrium, we have  ( ) 4 2 2 x 21 − = Π  <  41 4 x Π = , 
( ) 2 1 x 11 + = Π  >  31 2 2 x Π = ,  2 1 2 1 p41 > = ,  ( ) 2 1 4 2 2 p31 < − = , 
( ) 0 4 8 3 x 10 > + = Π ,  ( ) 0 4 1 2 x 40 > − = Π  and  .  0 30 20 = Π = Π
 
Corollary 1 states that in the special case of equal differences between the players’ 
valuations, the sabotage equilibrium derived in proposition 1 is unique. Moreover, player 
1’s sabotage effort as well as the stage 0 expected payoffs of players 1 and 4 are 
increasing in x. The rationale of this insight is as follows: The larger the (common) 
difference between the valuations of the players, the larger is player 1’s benefit from 
playing a final against player 4 instead of player 2. Hence, an increase in x makes 
sabotage more profitable for player 1 such that player 1 chooses a higher sabotage effort 
and the payoffs of players 1 and 4 increase. 
  With the semi-final valuations listed in corollary 1, we are also able to compute 
the productive effort levels in the final and the semi-finals. Let   be total expected 






 be total expected productive effort in the semi-final between i and j when there is no 
  15sabotage. Similarly,   a n d    denote total expected productive effort in the final when 




































E E E + + < + + . 
 
The intuition for these results is as follows: In the semi-final of the sabotage equilibrium, 
player 1 supports player 4. Hence, player 4 is stronger than in the no-sabotage 
equilibrium so that player 2 has to exert a larger productive effort resulting in an increase 
in the aggregate expected effort levels in the semi-final between 2 and 4 compared to the 






24 = > ). Moreover, advancing to the final becomes more 
attractive to the participants of the other semi-final, players 1 and 3, since player 4 has a 
higher chance of winning her semi-final. Hence, players 1 and 3 choose higher 






13 = > ). In sum, 
sabotage is good for the productive effort levels in the semi-finals. However, the 
expected effort level in the final is reduced by sabotage (
F F E
~
E < ). The reason is that the 
final is now not necessarily between the strongest players (in the case without sabotage, 
the final takes place between players 1 and 2 with almost sure certainty, see Groh et al., 
2003). Sabotage is therefore bad for productive effort in the final. And this negative 
effect of sabotage on productive effort in the final outweighs the positive effect of 
                                                 
9 The first two results in proposition 2 are true also for the general case where a, b and/or c may be different 
from x. But for the rest of the results in proposition 2, we need the condition a=b=c=x. 
 
 
  16sabotage on productive effort in the semi-finals so that total productive effort from both 
stages is reduced by sabotage. 
 
3.2  Seeding B: {1-2} and {3-4} 
Now suppose the two strongest players are grouped in one semi-final and the two 
weakest players in the other semi-final (we call this grouping seeding B). In the notation 
of section 2, we may write  ,  2 h = 1 = A ,  4 m =  and  3 n = . If at all, players 1 and 2 will 
benefit only from indirectly sabotaging player 3 and players 3 and 4 only from sabotaging 
player 1. Hence, we can already identify  0 e e e e 41 31 23 13 = = = =  as dominant strategies.  
Given this insight and computing the equilibrium expected payoffs (1) in the 
final, we may now specify the players’ semi-final valuations (2) – (5) as  
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) k V V p V V k V V p 1 k V V p 4 3 31 4 1 4 1 31 3 1 31 11 + − − − = + − − + + − = Π  (27) 
  () ( ) ( ) 42 32 4 2 31 3 2 31 21 e e k V V p 1 k V V p + + + − − + + − = Π   
  () 42 32 4 3 31 4 2 e e k V V p V V + + + − − − =       ( 2 8 )  
          ( 2 9 )   () k k p 1 k p 11 11 31 = − + = Π
  () 24 14 24 14 11 11 41 e e k e e k p 1 k p + + = + + − + = Π       (30) 
where   is the probability that player 3 advances to the final and   is the probability 
that player 1 advances to the final. 
31 p 11 p
  To determine the equilibrium on stage 0 of the game, note first that (29) and (30) 
imply  . Hence, the payoffs of players 3 and 4 on stage 0 are 
 and 
0 e e 24 14 31 41 ≥ + = Π − Π
32 30 e − = Π 42 24 14 42 31 41 40 e e e e − + = − Π − Π = Π , respectively. These payoffs 
immediately imply  , i.e., players 3 and 4 do not invest in sabotage. A similar  0 e e 42 32 = =
  17argument holds for the semi-final between players 1 and 2. From (27), (28) and 
 we obtain  0 e e 42 32 = = 0 V V 2 1 21 11 > − = Π − Π . This implies  24 20 e − = Π  and 
14 2 1 14 21 11 10 e V V e − − = − Π − Π = Π . It follows that 0 e e 24 14 = = , i.e., players 1 and 2 
also do not have an incentive for sabotage. We summarize this finding in 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose the players’ valuations are such that V1 > V2 > V3 > V4 and  
players 1 and 2 belong to one group and players 3 and 4 belong to another group. Then 
there exists a unique pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in which no player 
engages in sabotage.  
 
Players 3 and 4 have a smaller valuation of the final than players 1 and 2. Hence, both 
know that, even if they win the semi-final, the payoff in the final will be k, independent 
of whether they play the final against player 1 or player 2. Hence, indirectly sabotaging 
player 1 does not pay for the two weakest players, so they choose a zero sabotage effort. 
Player 1 is stronger than player 2 in the semi-final among the two strongest players. 
Given the zero sabotage efforts of players 3 and 4, player 2’s expected payoff from the 
semi-final is zero regardless of her sabotage effort. Hence, player 2 also chooses a zero 
sabotage effort. Finally, player 1’s payoff from the semi-final against player 2 equals the 
difference between her valuation and that of player 2, independent of the sabotage effort 
player 1 chooses. Hence, player 1 also decides to abstain from sabotage. In sum, under 
seeding B the possibility to sabotage potential rivals does not change the equilibrium in 
the final and the semi-final found in Groh et. al (2003).
10  
                                                 
10 Note also that proposition 3 is true not only in the limiting case k → 0, but for all values of k > 0. 
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3.3   Seeding C: {1,4} and {2,3} 
Finally, we take a look at the case where the strongest and the weakest player are grouped 
in one semi-final and the two middle players are grouped in the other semi-final (we call 
this grouping seeding C). In the notation of section 2, we may write  ,  ,  1 h = 4 = A 2 m =  
and  . For this seeding, appendix B proves  3 n =
 
Proposition 4: Suppose the players’ valuations are such that V1 > V2 > V3 > V4 and  
 players 1 and 4 belong to one group and players 2 and 3 belong to another group and 
. Then   0 k →
(i)  there does not exist a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in which 
only the most able player invests in sabotage, and  
(ii)  there does not exist a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in which 
none of the players invest in sabotage. 
 
The insight of this proposition is that in seeding C we cannot have pure-strategy 
equilibria as those derived in seedings A and B. The intuition of part (i) is that in seeding 
C, player 2 has the highest benefit from sabotage (i.e., V2 – V4). Hence, an equilibrium in 
which player 1 – who has a lower benefit from sabotage (i.e., V2 – V3) – invests in 
sabotage but player 2 does not, is not possible. The rational of part (ii) is that, in contrast 
to seeding B, in both semi-finals of seeding C at least one player would benefit from 
sabotage (remember that in the semi-final {3,4} under seeding B none of the players 
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benefits from sabotage and this is the driving force for the no-sabotage equilibrium in 
proposition 3). 
  Notice that also in seeding C player 4 does not engage in sabotage. For players 
2 and 3, only one of them will engage in sabotage, because at least one of them will not 
have a bigger semi-final valuation than the other. Hence, proposition 4 implies that an 
equilibrium, if it exists, must have the property that at least one player (either 2 or 3) and 
at most two players (1 and 2 or 1 and 3) will engage in sabotage. If there exists an 
equilibrium in which only one player invests in sabotage, that player cannot be player 1, 
given proposition 4(i). But if player 1 does not invest in sabotage, then player 2 has a 
bigger semi-final valuation than player 3. Therefore, if only one player engages in 
sabotage, then that player must be player 2. Unfortunately, due to the discontinuity of the 
winning probabilities and the payoff functions which lead to proposition 4 (see the proof 
in appendix B), it is difficult to analytically derive an equilibrium for seeding C in the 
case of V1 > V2 > V3 > V4. 
  In appendix C, we show that in case of V1 > V2 = V3 > V4, there is a pure-
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium under seeding C in which no player engages in 
sabotage. Indeed, if V2 = V3 (b = 0), then it is straightforward to show that there is no 
sabotage in any of the seedings. But this insight implies that V2 > V3 is crucial to the 






11 Note that the probabilities in equations (23) and (24) are undefined if b = 0 (i.e., V2 = V3). 
  
4. Discussion  of  Results 
In proposition 1, the result that  2 1 p41 >  is interesting. Player 4 has a higher winning 
probability than player 2 in the semi-final although player 2 has a higher ability. Chen 
(2003) also finds that a player with a higher ability might have a lower probability of 
success than a player with a lower ability because other contestants direct more sabotage 
effort at the player with a higher ability. 
In what follows, all the results when sabotage is not feasible are taken from Groh 
et al. (2003). If sabotage is not feasible, player 1’s success probability in seeding A
12 is 1 
as . Player 1’s probability of success in stage 1 is less than 1, if sabotage is 
feasible.
0 k →
13 However, player 1 prefers the sabotage equilibrium because the probability of 
meeting player 4 is higher.
14 Player 2 has a higher success probability if sabotage is not 
feasible. She prefers the no-sabotage equilibrium (i.e., when sabotage is not feasible) 
because her payoff is positive which is greater than her zero payoff in the sabotage 
equilibrium. Player 3 is indifferent because her payoff is zero in both equilibria but player 
4 prefers the sabotage equilibrium. In sum, if the goal is to improve the selection 
properties of the contest, then allowing sabotage is bad because the top two players, 1 and 
2, have lower success probabilities in the sabotage equilibrium than in the no-sabotage 
equilibrium. However, the sabotage equilibrium may be preferred by some of the players 
including the most able player.  
                                                 
12 Notice that we label the seedings differently from Groh et al. (2003).  
13 It is easy to show that p31 > 0, which implies that p11 < 1. The proof of this result is available on request. 
But corollary 1 gives an example. 
14 Notice that, in proposition 1, player 1 could have chosen e14 = 0 in the sabotage equilibrium (given that 
the others players have chosen zero sabotage) but she did not. Clearly, she must be better off by choosing a 
positive level of sabotage. 
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Indeed, a difference between our result and Chen (2003) is that the most able 
player may be better off when indirect sabotage is allowed. This result is not possible in 
Chen (2003), where only direct sabotage is allowed. Another difference is that in Chen 
(2003) it is never the case that a more able player engages in sabotage but a less able 
player does not.
15 In our model, this is possible. In seeding A, it is not surprising that 
player 1 is the only one who engages in sabotage once we notice that she derives the 
highest benefit from sabotage. The benefits of a successful sabotage are V2 – V4, V2 – V3, 
V3 – V4, and zero to players 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. It is easy to see that V2 – V4 is 
the highest of these benefits. 
  It is insightful to examine the difference in results between seedings A and B. 
The main difference between proposition 1 (seeding A) and proposition 3 (seeding B) is 
that player 1 invests in sabotage in seeding A but not in seeding B. This result accords 
with intuition. In seeding A, player 1’s benefit of successful sabotage is that she meets 
player 4 instead of player 2. In seeding B, player 1’s benefit of successful sabotage is that 
she meets player 4 instead of player 3. Clearly, player 1’s benefit of sabotage is higher 
under seeding A than under seeding B. This explains why player 1 invests in sabotage 
under seeding A, but never does in seeding B.  
  An alternative explanation for why player 1 does not invest in sabotage in 
seeding B is based on the observation that sabotage is a public good. Notice that the 
benefits of sabotage by a player are also enjoyed by the player in his group. In seeding B, 
 
15In a model with two players where only the sabotage of current rivals is possible, Kräkel (2004) also finds 
an equilibrium in which only the more able player invests in sabotage. However, sabotage is costless is in 
his model. Also, he does not investigate sabotage of potential rivals, so the rationale of the result in his 
model is completely different from the one in our model. Finally, his model is unable to generate equilibria 
where no player invests in sabotage or a player with lower ability has a higher probability of success.  
  if player 1 sabotages player 3, that also benefits player 2. Given the public good nature of 
sabotage, a necessary condition for player 1 to invest in sabotage is that the benefits of 
sabotage must be bigger for player 1 than for player 2 such that the difference  
 increases. But this difference is a constant,  21 11 Π − Π 0 V V 2 1 21 11 > − = Π − Π  in 
seeding B. Conversely, in seeding A, the difference 
( 3 2 41 2 1 31 11 V V p V V ) − + − = Π − Π  is increasing in the success probability of player 
4.  Notice that player 1 gets a positive payoff no matter who she meets in the final.  
Player 3 only gets a positive payoff if she meets player 4. The difference in the gains 
from this public good (i.e., sabotage) are not the same. It is not surprising then that player 
1, the player with the higher valuation (gain) for this public good, provides the public 
good in seeding A. 
  It is important to note that sabotage and productive effort are not perfect 
substitutes although they both have the same constant marginal costs. This is because a 
player has to first think of winning before sabotaging. In other words, it may make sense 
to invest in only productive effort and nothing in sabotage but it never makes sense to 
invest in only sabotage but invest nothing in productive effort. There is no point in 
investing in sabotage, if you have no chance of winning. 
To obtain proposition 1, we assumed that V1 – V2 ≥ V2 – V3. This condition 
ensures that player 3 will not invest in sabotage because her expected payoff in stage 1 is 
zero. However, player 3's valuation is increasing in the sabotage effort of player 2. Also, 
player 2's valuation is increasing in  31 Π . Therefore, player 2 derives a benefit from 
helping player 3. The reason why player 2 sets e23 = 0 is because while there are benefits 
of sabotaging, the cost required to do so is too much. Note also that even though  
  23player 1's payoff is always positive, it decreases as  31 Π  increases but is never zero, given  
V1 – V2 ≥ V2 – V3. 
  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored a hitherto uncharted area of research on contests: the 
sabotage of potential rivals. The only papers which examine sabotage in a model with 
non-identical players are Chen (2003) and Kräkel (2004). In these models, where players 
sabotage current rivals, there is always an equilibrium in which someone engages in 
sabotage. In contrast, in our model, where players sabotage potential rivals there could be 
a unique equilibrium with no sabotage. We also find that only the most-able player may 
engage in sabotage and indeed prefers a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where 
sabotage is banned. While our analysis was based on certain simplifying assumptions, we 
were still able to obtain interesting results which had not been known in the literature. 
  There are several possible areas of future research. For example, in proving 
proposition 1, we had to assume a special condition which simplified the analysis 
significantly. A possible task for future research is to relax this condition, but it should be 
noted that this is fairly challenging. Another extension would be to incorporate the 
sabotage of current rivals in addition to the sabotage of potential rivals in the same 
model. We could also consider making sabotage permanent. That is, helping a weaker 
player to win in the semi-final makes this player stronger if she advances to the final. 
Moreover, sabotage through a third-party might be more socially acceptable than 
direct sabotage. For example, people frown upon negative campaign information by a 
politician against her rival. But positive information about a potential rival’s current 
opponent will not be seen as a negative conduct. Hence direct and indirect sabotage 
  24might have different social costs and it may be worthwhile to investigate the normative 
implications of this. In our model, the implicit assumption is that the cost of direct 
sabotage is infinitely large (i.e., prohibitive). 
 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2 






13 = = . Applying the result from Baye et al. (1996) 
yields  () 2 1 E 11 31 31
S
13 Π Π + Π = . Inserting the stage 1 valuations from corollary 1 gives 
( ) ( ) 0 2 2 2 2 3 x E
S
13 > + + = . Similarly,  ( ) ( ) 0 8 2 5 8 x 2 1 E 31 21 21
S
24 > − = Π Π + Π = . 
This completes the proof of the first part of proposition 2. 
 For  proving  , note that Groh et al. (2003) show 
F F E
~
E < () 2 V V 1 V E
~
1 2 2
F + = . In 




































































We know that  () ( ) 2 V V 1 V 2 V V 1 V 1 4 4 1 2 2 + > + , since  . Moreover, 
 implies  , 
4 2 V V >
x c b a = = = x V V 1 2 − = x 2 V V 1 3 − =  and  x 3 V V 1 4 − = .   requires 
. We then obtain after some computations 
0 V4 >
x 3 V 1 >






























This condition is always satisfied, since due to   it can be written as 
. In the same way, we obtain  
x 3 V 1 >






1 > − > − −






























which is always satisfied since  . Taking into account 
these relations as well as 






1 > − > − −
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1 p 1 p p 1 p p 1 p 1 p p 41 31 31 41 41 31 41 31 = − + − + − − +  in (A.1) 


















E E E : − − − + + = ∆  and show 
that  . Inserting all E’s and E’s yields after some computations  0 < ∆
~
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) x V x 2 V V 8










+ + + − + + + −
= ∆ . 
The idea of the proof is to take as given   and to maximize  1 V ∆ with respect to x subject 
to the constraint  3 V x 0 1 < < . Differentiating ∆, it is straightforward to show that 
0 dx d
2 2 > ∆ . Hence,   is convex in x and reaches a maximum either for   or  ∆ 0 x →
3 V x 1 → . Calculating the limits yields  0 lim
0 x = ∆
→  and  0 16 V lim 1 3 V x 1
< − = ∆
→ . Hence, in 
the relevant range   is always negative as required.   QED  ∆
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4 
Suppose we have an equilibrium where at most player 1 invests in sabotage, i.e.   
and all other sabotage efforts are zero. Computing the expected payoffs in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium of stage 2 according to (1), we may write the stage 1 valuations of 
the players as 
0 e13 ≥
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) k V V p V V k V V p 1 k V V p 3 2 31 2 1 2 1 31 3 1 31 11 + − + − = + − − + + − = Π , (B.1) 
  ,         ( B . 2 )   () k k p 1 k p 31 31 41 = − + = Π
  26  () ( ) ( ) k V V p k p 1 k V V p 4 2 41 41 4 2 41 21 + − = − + + − = Π ,     (B.3) 
  () ( ) ( ) 13 4 3 41 13 41 4 3 41 31 e k V V p e k p 1 k V V p + + − = + − + + − = Π .   (B.4) 
With this insight, we can prove both parts of proposition 4 by contradiction. Consider 
first part (i). Suppose we have an equilibrium where only player 1 invests in sabotage, i.e. 
. Equations (B.1) and (B.2) imply  0 e13 > ( ) 0 V V p V V 3 2 31 2 1 41 11 > − + − = Π − Π . Hence, 
we only have to distinguish two cases: case 1 with  41 11 Π > Π  and  31 21 Π ≥ Π , and case 2 
with   and  . According to (B.3) and (B.4), case 1 is possible only if 
. But   and the results in Baye et al. (1996) imply 
41 11 Π > Π 21 31 Π ≥ Π
41 13 bp e ≤ 41 11 Π > Π
 











Letting   yields   and, thus, the condition for case 1 is  . But 
this contradicts  . To put another way, case 1 is only possible for  . 
0 k → 0 p41 = 0 bp e 41 13 = ≤
0 e13 > 0 e13 =
  It remains to derive a contradiction in case 2.  41 11 Π > Π  and  31 21 Π ≤ Π  now 
imply  
  ()
k 2 e 2 cp 2












− = ,  











The fixed point of these equations for   is  0 k → 0 p41 =  and  1 p31 = . Note that this is true 
independent of the sabotage effort level. But  41 11 Π > Π  and  1 p31 =  also imply 
 and, thus,   cannot be an equilibrium: For every 
, player 1 has an incentive to reduce  , since this increases her stage 0 payoff 
without changing  . This contradiction completes the proof of part (i). 
13 13 31 10 e b a e bp a − + = − + = Π 0 e13 >
0 e13 > 13 e
1 p31 =
  27  Let us now turn to part (ii). Suppose we have an equilibrium in which none of 
the players invest in sabotage so that also  . 0 e13 =  Then we are back to lemma 2 of Groh 
et al. (2003), where   and  0 p41 = 2 1 p31 = . Player 1’s payoff is  2 b a 10 + = Π . Suppose 
now player 1 deviates from this equilibrium, and invests a small but positive   in 
sabotage. Then we know from our analysis of part (i) that   jumps from 1/2 to 1 




2 b a e b a 13 10 + > − + = Π , since there always exists a small but positive   s u c h  t h a t   13 e
2 b e 0 13 < < . Hence, player 1 will deviate from a zero sabotage equilibrium. This proves 
part (ii) of proposition 4.     QED 
 
Appendix C: Equilibrium in Seeding C if V1 > V2 = V3 > V4  
In this appendix we prove  
 
Proposition 5: Suppose the players’ valuations are such that V1 > V2 = V3 > V4 and  
 players 1 and 4 belong to one group and players 2 and 3 belong to another group. Then 
there exists a unique pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in which no player 
engages in sabotage. 
 
Suppose first  . We know that player 4 never invests in sabotage. Since V 21 31 Π ≤ Π 2 = V3 
and players 2 and 3 are in the same group, it follows that player 1 will not invest in 
sabotage. Using the results in Baye et al. (1996),  21 31 Π ≤ Π  imply  34 30 e − = Π  which, in 
turn, yields  . For player 2, we obtain   0 e34 =
  2824 41 24 31 21 20 e bp e − = − Π − Π = Π .       (C.1) 
But V2 = V3 implies b = 0. Therefore, . Hence, no player invests in sabotage if 
. 
0 e24 =
21 31 Π ≤ Π
Now turn to the case  21 31 Π ≥ Π . Again, player 4 will not invest in sabotage and b = 
0 implies that player 1 will not invest in sabotage.  21 31 Π ≥ Π  implies  . For player 
3, we obtain 
0 e24 =
34 41 34 21 31 30 e bp e − − = − Π − Π = Π        ( C . 2 )  
But b = 0 implies  . Also for  0 e34 = 21 31 Π ≥ Π  no player invests in sabotage and in both 
cases, the equilibrium is unique.    QED 
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